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行政规章在行政诉讼中的地位与作用/王小卫

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行政规章在行政诉讼中的地位与作用

王小卫


《行政诉讼法》第五十三条第一款规定“人民法院审理行政案件,参照国务院部委根据国务院的行政法规、决定、命令制定发布的规章以及省、自治区、直辖市和省、自治区、直辖市的人民政府所在的市和国务院批准的较大的市的人民政府根据法律和国务院的行政法规制定、发布的规章。”行政审判“参照适用”行政规章,这不但是《行政诉讼法》的明确规定,也是当前法学界通行的观点。一般认为这里的“参照适用”是指人民法院在对行政案件进行司法审查时对具体行政行为所适用的规章参酌、鉴定之后,决定是否适用。按照这个解释,“我们可以理解为,如果行政机关作出的具体行政行为是根据符合法律的规章作出的,人民法院就应当适用该规章,判决维持原具体行政行为;如果行政机关的具体行政行为是根据不符合法律、行政法规原则精神作出的,人民法院就可以不适用该规章,判决撤消原具体行政行为。”①由此可见,基于《行政诉讼法》第五十三条第一款的规定,行政规章在行政诉讼中处于行政审判中的“参照”地位而其作用仅在于:当法院通过司法审查,在认定行政规章合法有效的基础上“参照适用”,从而对具体行政行为是否合法作出裁判。

这种通说观点,究其实质,只是在行政规章合法有效的前提下才能发挥其应有的作用,而在行政规章被人民法院通过司法审查认定为不符合法律、法规时则会产生诸多问题,使行政机关在作出具体行政行为时“参照适用”行政规章之法律规定及由此推导出的各种论断均难以自圆其说。

下面就有关因《行政诉讼法》第五十三条第一款之规定及由此推导出的行政规章在行政诉讼中的地位与作用问题所导致产生的诸多法律疑问略作探讨。

问题一:如何认定行政规章是否符合法律、法规。

有关行政规章的适用问题,总是在具有行政职权的行政机关依据行政规章作出被诉的具体行政行为,相对人向人民法院提起行政诉讼的过程中产生的。即人民法院在此情况下,必须作出是否适用作为被诉的具体行政行为依据的规章的决定。一般的学术观点总是拘泥于人民法院对是否适用行政规章是否具有完全的自决权,即认为法院在对行政规章进行司法审查后,若行政规章符合法律、法规或有法律法规的依据,则必须使用该规章,反之则必不得适用该规章。这属于法制观念淡薄时期,人们对法律规定的理解不深刻所产生的问题。而对于《行政诉讼法》第五十三条第一款的规定所涉及的实质性问题则少有人论及。这就是究竟该如何认定行政规章是否符合法律、行政法规。

对此,法律及行政法规没有做任何形式的条文规定,相关的司法解释也未对此作出确切的说明。此问题,我们可以从下面两个层面来具体分析。

其一,认定作为被诉具体行政行为依据的行政规章是否合法有效的适格主体是谁?这个问题似乎不难解答。因为依《行政诉讼法》第五十三条第一款的规定,人民法院在审理行政案件时可以参照行政规章。这里实施参照行为的主体无疑是人民法院,而且也只能是人民法院。根据通说认为的“参照”即审查行政规章是否符合法律、行政法规,那么据此即可得出结论:在行政主体依行政规章作出具体行政行为所引起的行政诉讼中,认定行政规章是否合法有效的唯一适格主体应是受理审理该被诉具体行政行为的人民法院。

其二,认定作为被诉具体行政行为依据的行政规章是否合法有效的标准应是什么?是确认制定行政规章的主体是否适格,是看行政规章所确定的条款内容是否合法,还是考虑行政规章的制定是否有一定的法律依据?《行政诉讼法》及其相关的立法解释、司法解释均未对此作明确的规定。因为没有明确的法律、法规条文规定,故在司法实践中,只能由人民法院行使自由裁量权来解决了。而人民法院可以决定是否适用被诉的具体行政行为作出时所依据的规范性文件,这必将产生扩大司法自由裁量权与缩小具体行政行为稳定性的双重不利后果,对行政机关的行政管理活动必将产生极大的消极作用,并有司法权干预行政权之嫌。这一问题是由《行政诉讼法》第五十三条第一款司法机关在审理行政纠纷案件时“参照适用”行政规章之规定本身所导致产生的,故在现有的法律、法规框架内是无法予以妥善解决的。

问题二:人民法院在案件审理中对行政规章是否合法有效的认定,是认定被诉的具体行政行为所涉及的那部分,还是对行政规章整体内容的全面认定呢?

人民法院在审理涉及行政规章的行政案件时,必须对是否参照适用行政规章作出明确的认定,而决定是否能“参照适用”的前提是认定该涉及行政诉讼的具体行政行为作出时所依据的行政规章是否合法有效。这就必然涉及到对涉诉的行政规章是否合法有效作出整体的认定,还是仅就与行政诉讼案件有关联的局部内容作出是否合法有效的认定问题。这在现行法律、法规及其相关的司法解释中同样没有作出任何明确的规定。对此,我们可以作以下两个假设予以更进一步的分析。

假设一,规定对行政规章是否合法有效的认定是对行政规章整体内容的认定。这样,我们就可以得出这样一个结论:即只要被提起行政诉讼的具体行政行为是依照行政规章作出的,则人民法院就可以据此对该行政规章进行全面整体的司法审查,并进而认定其是否合法有效,能否在对该具体行政行为的裁判中适用。这样则人民法院对涉诉的行政规章就具有进行全面审查的权利。如此,则会导致产生这样一个问题,若作出具体行政行为的行政机关所依据的行政规章中与该正在审理中的行政诉讼案件有关的那部分内容经审查是有法律、法规依据且合法有效的,而与该案没有直接关联的该行政规章的其他部分的内容经审查缺少法律、法规依据或因违法而无效,那么人民法院就应该认定该行政规章无效,并决定在行政审判中对行政机关在作出具体行政行为时所依据的行政规章不予“参照适用”。而现实中,行政规章因其制定主体的级别较低,程序不规范而存在着诸多的违法现象。如此全面审查,则合法有效而可以“参照适用”的行政规章寥寥无几。这必不利于作为行政诉讼被告的行政主体实施行政管理活动。故该假设在现实中操作的价值并不大。也就是说,人民法院对涉诉的行政规章是否合法有效的审查不应是整体内容的审查。

假设二:规定人民法院对行政规章是否合法有效的认定仅是对被诉的具体行政行为所涉及的那部分内容的审查认定。由此我们同样可以得出这样一个结论,即人民法院在决定是否适用行政规章前对行政规章依法进行审查时,只能对被诉的具体行为行为所涉及的那部分内容认定是否合法有效,而对被诉的具体行政行为没有涉及的内容则无权进行司法审查。据此,如进一步推论,若多个相同或不同、相关或不相关被诉的具体行政行为分别所依据的同一行政规章之各部分的内容在行政诉讼中分别被人民法院审查认定为不符合法律、法规,那么,在此假设条件下亦不能对该行政规章作出整体违法无效的定论。这样的结果也是现代法治社会的法律意识和制度所不能容许的。

既然这两种假设经推理论证均行之不通,那么是否有第三条路或者其它更便捷的途径来解决这一问题呢?笔者认为,对这一问题是没有行之有效的第三条路可走的。该问题是基于《行政诉讼法》第五十三条第一款不合理之规定而产生的。

问题三: 在行政诉讼中因人民法院确认据以作出具体行政行为的行政规章因违法无效而导致行政主体在该诉讼中败诉,并承担相应的法律责任。由此则产生这样一个矛盾:部分行政相对人因不依行政规章的规定行事,被有权行政主体依该行政规章作出相应的处罚决定,若该部分行政相对人对此处罚不服而向人民法院提起行政诉讼,人民法院又依职权审查认定该行政规章因违法而无效,并判决依该行政规章作出被诉具体行政行为的行政主体承担由此产生的法律责任,那么相应的,这部分行政相对人的合法权益通过诉讼途径得到了法律的保障。而另一方面,其他的行政相对人却因充分信赖该行政规章的合法有效性而按照行政规章规定的要求履行了该行政规章对其设定的法律义务。这样,当该行政规章在被前一部分行政相对人提起的行政诉讼中被人民法院经审查认定为违法无效,则遵守并依据该行政规章履行义务的那部分行政相对人的合法权益就因人民法院确认该行政规章违法无效而作出的判决所侵害。此时,这部分行政相对人虽然也可以通过行政诉讼的途径来维护自己的合法权益,但就其整体来说,这种状况导致产生了很低的社会的诉讼的效益,仍是不可取的。因为,首先对行政相对人而言,无论其是否遵守该行政规章并履行该行政规章规定的义务,他的合法权益仍将遭受必然的侵害,而他只能通过诉讼的方式来保护自己的合法权益。其次就行政主体而言,他依该被人民法院在行政诉讼中通过司法审查确认为违法无效而决定不予“参照适用”的行政规章作出了具体行政行为,就必须对所有的行政相对人,包括依据该行政规章行事和未依据该行政规章行事的行政相对人,均承担不可避免的败诉的法律责任,而没有任何回转的余地。

那么,如此不合理之结果是如何产生的呢?通过在问题三中的分析,行政规章作为抽象行政行为的范畴,与在行政诉讼中受人民法院合法性审查的双重身份决定了这种矛盾的产生。

首先,按照有关抽象行政行为的理论,行政规章属于抽象行政行为的范畴。《行政诉讼法》第五十三条第一款又规定“人民法院审理行政案件,参照……规章”。同时根据宪法第九十条的规定,制定行政规章应“根据法律和国务院的行政法规”。即只有当法律、行政法规对某一行政管理事项已有明文规定的情况下,有权机关才能据此制定相应的行政规章。否则,行政规章就是不合法的。行政规章的这种法律性决定了人民法院在参照适用行政规章时,应首先对行政规章进行司法审查,审查被诉的行政主体作出的具体行政行为所依据的行政规章的制定程序及内容(包括主体、权限、内容、程序)是否合法,以决定是否适用以及如何适用。依照“制定行政规章是抽象行政行为”的认定,则行政规章具有一般规范性法律文件所共有的特征:即确定性、强制性和不可诉性。而依人民法院在决定是否适用行政规章前,应首先对行政规章进行审查的观点,则行政规章又具有可受司法审查性。而这两者本是不相融的。这种不合理现象产生的原因,完全是由《行政诉讼法》第五十三条第一款的不合理之规定所导致的。

问题四:《行政诉讼法》第五十三条第一款的规定,使得依行政规章作出具体行政行为的行政主体所作出的具体行政行为的效力处于悬而未决的状态。这必将导致行政行为缺乏相对的确定力、拘束力及执行力,从而使具体行政行为的目的很难在正常途径及条件下得以实现。

“行政行为的作出必须有法定的依据”②,是指行政行为作出时应具备明确的法律、法规或规章依据,并且作到适用法律、法规及规章正确。由此可见行政规章是可以作为行政主体作出具体行政行为的“法律依据”的。也就是说行政主体可依行政规章作出合法有效的具体行政行为。就一般看来,所有行政行为都具有“确定力”、“拘束力量”、“执行力”的效力。结合前面的论断,我们可以得出如是结论:行政主体可依据行政规章作出具有确定力、拘束力和执行力的具体行政行为。这个结论不但是一般的行政法原理推论所得出的必然结论,而且也是确保行政主体依据数量庞大的行政规章作出具有确定力、拘束力和执行力并能实现行政管理根本目的之具体行政行为的理论根据。简言之,行政主体依据行政规章作出的具体行政行为具有确定力、拘束力和执行力。换句话说,就是依据行政规章作出的具体行政行为的确定力、拘束力、执行力是建立在作为作出具体行政行为依据的行政规章之上的。那么假设此处的行政规章的效力是不确定的,那又会如何?

行政规章是行政主体依行政规章行事时的基础和依据。若此基础动摇了或者说作为基础的行政规章是否有效成立是不确定的,那么必然会导致建立在此基础上的具体行政行为的确定力、拘束力、执行力荡然无存。也就是说,行政主体依据行政规章作出的具体行政行为在被提起行政诉讼,由人民法院进行司法审查予以确认前是没有确定力保障的。如此则势必会影响行政主体为了社会的整体利益进行行政管理目的的实现,使行政管理行为处于社会公众及司法的不信任状态下,这是建设现代化的法治社会所不容许出现的。

问题五:人民法院在涉及到行政规章作为具体行政行为依据的行政案件中有权对行政规章是否合法有效进行司法审查,而行政规章同时又是行政机关作出具体行政行为的重要依据之一,只是否会导致使人民法院具有了行政立法权呢?

行政立法是指国家行政机关依法定的权限和程序,制定行政法规和行政规章的活动。故行政立法是国家行政机关的权利和行为,显然与人民法院无涉。而对《行政诉讼法》第五十三条第一款可引申解释为人民法院有权确认国家行政机关通过法定程序确定的行政规章是否合法有效,并在行政诉讼中决定是否“参照适用”。虽然法学界一般认为这种情况可以理解为司法对行政立法的监督。但笔者认这是不够严谨的论断。其实这里人民法院对行政规章进行司法审查的实质是确认行政规章是否合法有效,并决定其是否可在行政审判中予以适用。而“人民法院对行政立法的监督”则是指人民法院通过审查,如果认为相应行政规章违法越权或违反法定程序和法定形式,就可以向相关行政机关或其上级行政机关、人民代表大会及其常委会提出撤消或改变的建议。故此可认为人民法院在审理行政案件的过程中对涉案的行政规章进行是否合法及直接决定是否适用的监督方式,已超越司法对行政立法监督的合理界限,在本质上构成越权。行政规章在行政诉讼中的地位虽被定义为“参照适用”,但行政规章作为一种具有“法律”效力的规范性文件,其制定程序却是有着严格的法律、法规依据。即它在经历了规划起草、征求意见的基础上,应交送政府主管机关而非人民法院或其他国家机关进行审理、核查,并由行政主管机关的正式会议而非人民法院或其他国家机关讨论通过,最后还须行政机关的行政首长签署发布并需备案。在这些法定程序中,并没有那个环节提及人民法院在行政规章的制定、发布及生效过程中的作用问题。可以肯定的说,人民法院依《行政诉讼法》第五十三条第一款的规定在行政诉讼过程中对行政规章进行司法审查的根本实质是对行政立法的越权干预。

通过前面的分析论述,可以看出,把行政规章在行政诉讼中的地位置于人民法院在审理行政案件时的“参照适用”,在理论及实际操作中有诸多疑问难以解决。故实有必要讨论重新构建行政规章在行政诉讼中的地位与作用问题。笔者为此特提出如下思路,以供讨论。

行政规章的制定作为一种抽象行政行为,致使行政规章在行政诉讼中的性质属“法律适用”的范畴。而正是行政规章的这种属性,导致了行政规章在行政诉讼中的地位、作用的混乱。所以要重构行政规章在行政诉讼中的地位与作用,就有必要对行政规章在行政诉讼中的性质予以矫正,进而作出新的定性。
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Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements


OUTLINE

I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation



I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:

“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”

II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7

成都市爱国卫生管理条例

四川省人大常委会


成都市爱国卫生管理条例
四川省人大常委会


(1996年5月23日四川省成都市第十二届人民代表大会常务委员会第十八次会议通过 1996年10月14日四川省第八届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十三次会议批准)

目 录

第一章 总 则
第二章 监督与管理
第三章 奖励与处罚
第四章 附 则

第一章 总 则
第一条 为加强爱国卫生管理,推动卫生工作的社会化,提高社会卫生综合效益,促进经济发展和社会进步,根据《中华人民共和国宪法》和国务院《公共场所卫生管理条例》规定,结合成都市实际,制定本条例。
第二条 本条例所称爱国卫生是指政府领导,全社会参与,旨在强化社会卫生意识,改善城乡卫生条件,控制和消除危害健康因素,提高环境卫生质量、生活卫生质量和人民健康水平的群众性卫生活动。
第三条 爱国卫生工作按照属地管理的原则,实行目标责任管理和委员部门分工负责制。
本市实行爱国卫生月、城市清洁日和周卫生日制度。
第四条 市和区(市)县人民政府应当把爱国卫生工作纳入国民经济和社会发展计划,统筹安排,加强环境保护和卫生基础设施建设,使环境卫生质量、生活卫生质量的改善和提高与经济建设协调发展。
第五条 市和区(市)县爱国卫生运动委员会(以下简称爱卫会)负责统筹、组织、协调本辖区内的爱国卫生工作;爱卫会的各委员部门应按照分工,各司其职,密切配合,并负责本系统的爱国卫生工作。市和区(市)县爱卫会办公室负责日常具体工作。
第六条 本市行政区域内的单位和个人应遵守本条例,对违反本条例的行为有检举的权利和义务。

第二章 监督与管理
第七条 市和区(市)县爱卫会经同级人民政府批准,聘任爱国卫生监督员,负责具体实施爱国卫生监督检查工作,具体办法由市人民政府另行规定。
第八条 区(市)县爱卫会可在有关单位聘任爱国卫生检查员,负责爱卫会委托的爱国卫生检查工作,其聘任条件、办法和工作职责由市爱卫会规定。
第九条 爱国卫生监督员和检查员在执行职务时,应佩戴标志,出示证件。爱国卫生监督员和检查员可向单位或个人收集有关爱国卫生工作的资料和证据。
第十条 各单位应落实爱国卫生工作责任制,并接受辖区爱卫会组织的检查考核。
第十一条 乡(镇)人民政府应加强场镇卫生基础设施建设和日常卫生管理;开展农村改善饮水卫生条件、修建卫生厕所和粪便无害化处理等社会卫生工作,并纳入村镇建设规划。
第十二条 各单位应开展健康教育工作,使各项指标达到国家规定标准。中小学校应开设健康教育课;幼儿园(班)应进行卫生保健常识教育。
第十三条 全市要定期统一开展杀灭病媒生物的活动。
各单位、家庭、个人都应开展、参加杀灭鼠、蝇、蚊和蟑螂等病媒生物及消除其孳生场所的活动,使病媒生物的密度控制在国家规定的标准以内。
第十四条 各单位应当健全卫生制度,保持本单位内的环境卫生,达到以下卫生标准:
(一)按规定设置卫生设施;
(二)单位内部卫生管理有序;
(三)无乱堆、乱放以及焚烧杂物、废弃物;
(四)排水畅通,无污水粪便漫溢。
第十五条 生产、经营杀灭病媒生物的药品、药械,须经市级以上法定检验机构抽验,符合国家规定标准。

第三章 奖励与处罚
第十六条 有下列情形之一的单位或个人,由市或区(市)县人民政府或爱卫会给予表彰、奖励、授予其爱国卫生荣誉称号:
(一)卫生水平显著提高,经考核鉴定达到卫生城市(镇)、卫生单位或卫生村标准的;
(二)有效控制鼠、蝇、蚊和蟑螂等病媒生物,经考核签定达到国家标准的;
(三)在爱国卫生管理工作中成绩突出的;
(四)在爱国卫生科学研究中做出突出贡献取得显著成效的;
(五)在爱国卫生工作中做出突出贡献或从事爱国卫生管理工作三十年以上的。
第十七条 有下列情形之一的单位或个人,由授予其爱国卫生荣誉称号的机关或上一级机关取消其荣誉称号:
(一)弄虚作假取得爱国卫生荣誉称号的;
(二)卫生水平下降已不符合爱国卫生荣誉称号标准的。
有前款第(一)项所列情形的,同时追回其所获取的奖金、奖品。
第十八条 违反本条例第十一条、第十二条规定的,市或区(市)县人民政府或爱卫会可根据情节在一定范围内予以通报批评;对负有直接责任的主管人员和直接责任人员,其所在单位或上级机关可给予行政处分。
第十九条 违反本条例第十三条第二款规定,责令限期改正,逾期不改的,视其情节轻重,对单位处以五百元至五千元罚款,对个人处以十元至五十元罚款。
第二十条 违反本条例第十四条规定,情节轻微的,给予警告,并责令限期改正。逾期未改正或情节严重的,处以五百元至五千元罚款,并通报批评;对责任人处以十元至五十元罚款,并责令限期改正。
第二十一条 违反本条例第十五条规定的,责令停止生产、经营,没收其违法生产、经营的药品、药械和违法所得,并处以违法所得一倍以上五倍以下罚款。
第二十二条 当事人对爱卫会给予的行政处罚决定不服的,可在接到处罚决定之日起十五日内向作出处罚决定的同级人民政府或上一级爱卫办申请复议,对复议决定不服的,可以在收到复议决定书之日起十五日内向人民法院提起诉讼,也可直接向人民法院提起诉讼。
第二十三条 当事人逾期不申请复议或不起诉,又不履行行政处罚决定的,由作出决定的爱卫会对到期不缴纳罚款的,每日按罚款总额的百分之三加处罚款,并申请人民法院强制执行。
第二十四条 罚没收入按有关法律、法规办理。
第二十五条 拒绝、阻碍爱国卫生监督员、检查员依法执行职务,违反《中华人民共和国治安管理处罚条例》的,由公安机关依法处理;构成犯罪的,由司法机关依法追究刑事责任。
第二十六条 爱国卫生监督员、检查员滥用职权、玩忽职守的,由其所在单位或上级机关给予行政处分,爱卫会解除其聘任;构成犯罪的,由司法机关依法追究刑事责任。

第四章 附 则
第二十七条 本条例具体应用中的问题由成都市人民政府负责解释。
第二十八条 本条例自公布之日起施行。市政府1981年5月公布的《成都市城市公共卫生管理暂行办法》和1995年8月公布的《成都市爱国卫生管理暂行办法》同时废止。



1996年10月14日